Consider a dynamic task allocation problem, where tasks are unknowingly distributed over an environment. This paper considers each task comprised of two sequential subtasks: detection and completion, where each subtask can only be carried out by a certain type of agent. We address this problem using a novel nature-inspired approach called "hunter and gatherer". The proposed method employs two complementary teams of agents: one agile in detecting (hunters) and another dexterous in completing (gatherers) the tasks. To minimize the collective cost of task accomplishments in a distributed manner, a game-theoretic solution is introduced to couple agents from complementary teams. We utilize market-based negotiation models to develop incentive-based decision-making algorithms relying on innovative notions of "certainty and uncertainty profit margins". The simulation results demonstrate that employing two complementary teams of hunters and gatherers can effectually improve the number of tasks completed by agents compared to conventional methods, while the collective cost of accomplishments is minimized. In addition, the stability and efficacy of the proposed solutions are studied using Nash equilibrium analysis and statistical analysis respectively. It is also numerically shown that the proposed solutions function fairly, i.e. for each type of agent, the overall workload is distributed equally.
2 presents a real-time single item auction based task allocation method for the multi-robot exploration problem and investigate new bid evaluation strategies.
While the works reviewed above [21] [22] [23] present different approaches to address a dynamic MRTA problem, they all similarly do not grant the agents the capabilities of developing the assignment algorithms. On this subject, [24] takes agents' capabilities into account in order to form teams by developing a market-based novel task allocation method based on Gini coefficient. Although the authors demonstrated that the proposed method can effectively improve the number of tasks completed by robot's system, the effect of cooperation and coupling between the formed teams is still uninvestigated. In a similar effort, [25] models agents' capabilities as actions and utilizes single-round auction to form teams and then forms coordination between agents of a same team. In the same way, coupling and cooperation of the formed teams have left unexplored in this work, though the developed framework was able to successfully resolve the required allocation issues. By the same token, [26] models the multi-robot system as a community of species considering agents' capabilities and then presents decentralized and centralized methods to efficiently control the heterogeneous teams of robots, regardless of interaction and collaboration between those teams. Given the review above, there is a lack of critical attention paid to the cooperation and coupling between robot teams, formed based on agents' capabilities, to address a dynamic MRTA problem.
This paper proposes a nature-inspired approach called "hunter and gatherer" which employs two teams of robots: a team of agile robots that can quickly explore an environment and detect tasks, called "hunters"; and a team of dexterous robots who accomplish detected tasks called "gatherers". In fact, we are turning dynamic MRTA problems into a problem where each task is comprised of two sequential subtasks: exploration and completion. Considering, when there are synchronization and precedence (SP) constraints which specify an ordering constraint for time-extended assignment (TA) problems [27] , the MRTA is referred to as a TA:SP problem [28] . To the best of the authors' knowledge, the MT-MR-TA:SP problem has not been tackled in the literature so far, while it is an ubiquitous problem in a wide variety of fields such as USAR, agricultural field operations etc.
Consider the USAR in a disaster site in which a number of victims have got stranded in unknown locations and need immediate rescue operations. Each victim is a task that needs to be detected first and then rescued buy a rescue operation that typically needs several dexterity actions which make a rescue robot heavy and incapable of agile search operations. Hence, let us consider each task comprised of two sequential subtasks: detection and completion, where each subtask can only be carried out by a certain type of agent. Thus, the case encounters a ST-MR-TA:SP or MT-MR-TA:SP problem. In the USAR example, hunters can be a group of small UAVs which search the site to locate victims, and gatherers can be a group of maxi-sized [29] heavy-duty UGVs that rescue detected victims relying on their dexterity capabilities.
According to the proposed hunter and gatherer scheme, we present a game-theoretic solution which considers coupling and cooperation between complementary agents divided into different teams by: 1) utilizing market-based negotiation models, auction [30] [31] [32] and reverse auction, and 2) introducing decentralized incentive-based decision-making algorithms. Proposed algorithms rely on new notions of certainty and uncertainty profit margins (CPM and UPM) that respectively determine the levels of confidence and conservativeness of each agent in negotiations to minimize the collective cost of task accomplishments. To enhance the effectiveness of proposed algorithms, a multitask-planning algorithm is invented for gatherer agents that enables them to queue multiple tasks in their action plan for finding the optimal solution for completing a group of tasks rather than doing one by one. We show that employing two complementary teams of hunters and gatherers can effectually improve the number of tasks completed by agents while the collective cost of accomplishments is minimized. Moreover, the stability and efficacy of the assignment algorithms are proven by a Nash equilibrium analysis and simulation experiments respectively. Besides, we investigated the distribution of workload, as the total costs and accomplishments of a mission, among agents and showed that the proposed algorithms function fairly, i.e. for each type of agent, the overall workload is distributed equally, and all agents of a same type behave analogously under similar characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: the problem statement and formulation are presented in Section II. In Section III, the methodology including conceptual frameworks, reasoning mechanisms, and algorithms are proposed. Nash equilibrium analysis is carried out in Section IV. In Section V, statistical analysis on simulation results are presented followed by a concluding discussion in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, the problem of hunter and gatherer mission planning (HGMP) in the context of dynamic MRTA is explained. Assume that there are m tasks distributed randomly over the environment, E. We consider a case that the number and the locations of tasks are unknown for agents before the execution of the HGMP. The set of tasks is denoted as 1) Tasks are stationary, i.e. they are fixed to their locations.
2) The cost of accomplishment of each task is equal to the distance that an agent moves to do a task. An agent is considered done with a task when it reaches to the task's location. 3) All agents of a same team are identical. 4) All agents are rational, i.e. they intend to maximize their expected utility. 5) All agents are fully autonomous and have their own utility functions, i.e. no global utility function there exist. 6) Agents from complementary teams can communicate with each other using a stably-connected network. Now, the HGMP problem can be stated as follows. Suppose that there exists a tuple for the mission such that HGMP = (E, , ).  denotes the assignment function which assigns m tasks to hg n n n =+ agents such that :

. Under the assumptions 1-6, the global objective  is to minimize the collective cost of  : ,, ,
where i k x and j k y are binary decision variables for h k t and g k t :
In (1), weighting parameters h  and g  are introduced to sum relative collective costs of complementary teams, because of the physical differences of each type.
This problem has a global objective  which can be achieved by determining the binary decision variables optimally. These variables need to be determined by the agents throughout explorations and negotiations in a distributed manner. Since agents are rational, each agent's objective is to maximize its own expected utility. As a consequence, the objectives of agents may be conflicting during the HGMP. Hence, the methodology should be developed so that handles these conflicts in order to maximize the effectiveness of the HGMP and achieve the global objective  .
III. METHODOLOGY

A. Conceptual Frameworks
Hunters are assigned to explore the unknown environment. There is h I as the incentive reward for a hunter, denoted as h i a , who detects a task, denoted as k T . However, the detected task can only be completed by cooperation with a gatherer. Thus, an extra incentive is added for motivating agents from complementary teams to build up a cooperation, denoted as ex I . Hunters and gatherers involve in negotiation processes to reach agreements for completing the tasks and sharing ex I between themselves. In a negotiation, a hunter who has detected a task on one side and one or more gatherers on the other side are involved. An agreement determines which gatherer is assigned to complete the detected task and how much is its share from the ex I . Let us denote , 01 h ki P  and ,, 1 gh k j k i P P =− as the proportions that h i a and g j a receive from ex I for accomplishment of k T respectively. Also, the gatherer who completes the detected task receives g I as a gathering incentive, when the task is completed. Since all agents are rational, they intend to maximize their incentives by accomplishing more tasks through building up more cooperation.
To establish the process by which agents come into an agreement, we define an online board on which each hunter announces the location of its new detection to find gathering partners for starting a negotiation process. Each gatherer follows the announcements on the online board to choose a waiting hunter for negotiation by analyzing the location information shared by each waiting hunter. A gatherer then sends a readiness message to the chosen hunter to start a negotiation.
We consider two possible scenarios in order to develop reasoning mechanisms for agents to negotiate and cooperate: (1) a waiting hunter receives only one readiness message, and (2) the waiting hunter receives more than one readiness messages. The first scenario resembles the bargaining or reverse auction process as there is only one buyer who aims to bargain for finding the most affordable option. The second scenario is similar to an auction process where usually there are more than one buyer interested in a specific object. We utilize these two market-based methods as negotiation models between negotiating agents. in addition, it is possible that the number of waiting hunters on the board, denoted as h w n , be more than one. In that case, the question that how a gatherer chooses a hunter among h w n waiting agents, is addressed in subsection 3.E. For the time being, we assume that gatherers already know how to choose a partner and we focus on the negotiation reasoning mechanisms.
Fundamentals of reasoning mechanisms are discussed in the next subsection, and next we will explain how agents rely on their reasoning mechanisms to behave in the reverse auction and auction scenarios in subsection 3.C and 3.D respectively.
B. Reasoning Mechanism
In this subsection, reasoning mechanisms for both hunters and gatherers are developed to establish their behavior during a mission that determines the way that they communicate, negotiate, and cooperate. Since fundamentals of reasoning mechanisms are similar for both type of agents, for the sake of brevity, we consider a general agent defined as z
Moving on, it is time to introduce the CPM and UPM for z a  . CPM is a circular margin with radius of c R  in which z a  is certain about a profitable agreement even if its share in ex I is zero. UPM is a circular margin, between two concentric circles with radiuses of u R  and c R  , in which z a  is uncertain about making a profit in an agreement, i.e. its profit strongly depends on its proportion of ex I . Further, z a  cannot make any profit beyond its UPM even if it receives ex I entirely. Fig. 1 shows the CPM and UPM as two concentric circles with z a  as the center. The agent compares its cost for accomplishing the task with its CPM and UPM to realize its state to make profitable decisions during the negotiation.
Subsequent statements explain the states of z a  with respect to its cost for accomplishing k t 
In addition, z a  receives a proportion of ex I that will be determined by the negotiation process so z a  is uncertain about its share of ex I . Thus, we define u R  by introducing   as a scaling parameter for the UPM:
Altogether, for z a  involved in a negotiation, the utility function defined below determines its payoff. Definition 1 (utility function).
gives the profit earned by z a  for accomplishing k t  and building up a cooperation. The utility function of z a  is defined as: T and 2 T are in agent's CPM and UPM, respectively. 3 T is beyond agent's uncertainty boundary.
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Now, we define a profit interval for z a  , regarding its state for accomplishing k t  , by which it evaluates its results in a negotiation. A profit interval is an interval for , kz P  that guarantees the negotiation's profitability. According to the assumption 4, z a  wants to maximize its payoff so in each negotiation, z a  definitely makes a non-negative profit, such that:
That can be written as: 
so the left side of (8) is greater than one.
Hence, the overlap of (8) and , 01 kz P   is null set, i.e. the task is not profitable. Accordingly, the profit interval of 
According to Fig. 3 , at the first decision node, h i a makes an offer regarding the explained process, and then at the second step, 
OOO   is assigned to vector "offers" in a random order.
Besides, g j a uses its own profit interval to make an acceptance or rejection decision. For each received offer made by h i a , if the offer is inside the g pi , then g j a accepts the offer. Otherwise, it rejects the offer.
D. The Second Scenario: Auction
Consider the auction scenario shown in Fig. 2 n  gatherers. In this case, h i a holds an auction and selects the winner, where gatherers bid for sharing ex I to win the detected task and complete it. Accordingly, both types of agents' reasoning mechanism need to be investigated.
We utilize the "second-price sealed-bid auction" [33] as the negotiation framework in which the winning bidder is an agent who has placed the highest bid and it pays the amount equal to the second highest bid to the hunter holding the auction. In this auction, g j a , a gatherer bidding in the auction, can bid its valuation. Since it won't pay as much as it bids if it wins, g j a still has a chance to get a positive benefit from the auction. Therefore, truthful bidding is an optimal strategy in a second-price auction. To that end, we explain how g j a bids using its profit intervals first and then we discuss the way that h i a chooses the winning bidder. g j a bids its valuation that is the lowest bound of its profit interval. Since g j a is making an offer to h i a by bidding, it should send the bid using ,, 1
Besides, h i a chooses the winner bidder after a single round of bidding. First, h i a chooses the winning bidder, g w a , regarding the maximum bid among the set of bids, denoted as b, such that: is an inefficient planning where 2,1 2,2 gg cc  .
Alternatively, if 1 g a was able to plan for multiple tasks at a time, it could gather 2 T at a lower cost. Accordingly, to prevent such ineffective plannings in the HGMP, in the following, a multitask-planning algorithm for gatherers is proposed. The proposed method relies on the CPM and UPM to develop gatherers' reasoning mechanism so that g j a fills up j  effectually.
To that end, a three-step process in which g j a chooses a waiting hunter agent for negotiation is proposed. Before starting the process, g j a follows the online board and lists the waiting hunters in h waiting A ordered by their waiting time, i.e. the oldest is the first in the list. Process' steps are elaborated in the following:
Step 1) g j a considers the most prior task from h waiting A , denoted as cand T . Then, g j a plans the shortest multi-destination temporary path, using A* search algorithm [34] , denoted as j   , to gather all tasks in j  plus cand T . When j   is generated, the temporary cost of each task must be updated in each task's profile.
Step (7) is still true for newly calculated temporary costs for each actual task. If (7) is true for all actual tasks, cand T is verified for starting a negotiation process; otherwise, g j a withdraws cand T and starts over from the first step.
Algorithm 2 illustrates the multitask-planning procedure for g j a . This algorithm is developed as a function for choosing a candidate task detected by a waiting hunter by considering j  . Not to mention, the output of this algorithm is not a task in agent's action plan, i.e. 
F. Decision-Making Algorithms
First, we propose a distributed decision-making algorithm determining the exploration, detection, and negotiating procedure for h i a in the HGMP. Algorithm 3 illustrates the decision-making procedure for h i a . In each iteration, h i a explores the environment to detect a task. When h i a detects a task, denoted as detected T , it announces the location on the online board and waits to receive readiness messages. According to the number of readiness messages that h i a receives, it starts a reverse auction or auction negotiation process to reach an agreement. If h i a reaches an agreement, then it start exploring the environment again. Otherwise, h i a announces its detection on the online board again and does the same procedure.  denotes the iteration number and max  denotes the maximum iterations in a mission. 
if hold == false then 3:
explore the environment 4:
if a new task is detected then 5: 
18: end for
Secondly, we present a distributed decision-making algorithm determining negotiating and accomplishment procedure in the HGMP for g j a regarding the explained reasoning mechanisms. Algorithm 4 illustrates the decision-making procedure for g j a . In each iteration, when max , g j a manages its action plan by calling the "choose partner" function first and then negotiate with the chosen hunter upon availability. If the negotiation is succeeded, then it adds the new task to j  and updates j  . Moreover, in each iteration, g j a follows j  to gather tasks in j  . When a task is gathered, g j a updates j  by removing the accomplished task.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
It is important to study the stability of the proposed algorithms to ensure that agents do not have motivation to change their behavior during the HGMP, i.e. to make sure that agents can make optimal decisions in the scenarios and do not vacillate in negotiations and task accomplishments. In this section we study the stability of the proposed algorithms in both reverse auction and auction scenarios.
A. The First Scenario: Reverse Auction
Consider a hunter and a gatherer agent whose preferences over outcomes are given by the utility functions () h hk Ut and () g gk Ut respectively. As shown in Fig. 3 , the model in which agents negotiate in the first scenario is a simplified reverse auction or bargaining process. According to the assumption 6, each agent obtains sufficient information about all actions and utilities. Thus, the model turns into a perfect-information extensive form game which resembles a sharing game. We know that Every (finite) perfect-information game in extensive form has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) [35] . However, existence of PSNE does not necessarily ensure that the output of the first scenario is a PSNE. It strongly depends on the decision-making algorithm of each agent. Therefore, we need to prove if the output of the proposed reasoning mechanisms in the first scenario is a PSNE.
According to the proposed reasoning mechanisms, each agent calculates a profit interval to make the most profitable decision. To be specific, h i a makes its best response by making offers that fall into its profit interval. Similarly, g j a makes its best response to the scenario by accepting the offers within its profit interval. In other words, the decision of each agent is its best possible response to the scenario, and it knows that the counterpart agent is also making its best response. We know that the strategy profile in which each agent is making its best response to other agent is a PSNE [35] . Consequently, the HGMP's outcome is a PSNE in the first scenario.
Although the model itself ensures the existence of PSNE and the reasoning mechanisms' outcome is a PSNE, the desirability of PSNE is still a considerable concern. The following numerical example explains the details on how scaling parameters can affect PSNE in the first scenario.
In the reverse auction scenario, pure strategies for 
B. The Second Scenario: Auction
In the second scenario, we investigate the existence of NE by a theorem based on the CPM and UPM concepts. We investigate 3 conditions to find the NE in an auction process. We will prove the theorem by contradiction, i.e. we show that no agent, involving in an auction scenario, has a motivation to deviate from a strategy profile which satisfies all 3 conditions. Theorem 1. Consider the HGMP in the second scenario associated with the second-price sealed-bid auction with participation of hunter and gatherers whose preferences over outcome are given by the utility functions () rejecting all bids and increase its payoff to 0 because it has a strong motivation to hold another auction at the following iterations and avoid a negative pay off. ■ Nevertheless, existence of NE does not necessarily ensure that the scenario's output is a NE. It strongly depends on the decisionmaking algorithm of each agent. In this regard, we know that each gatherer involving in the auction scenario places a bid according to (10) . That means, each gatherer agent bids its own valuation, i.e. jj bv = . Accordingly, conditions (i) and (ii) are always true because not only the winner has placed the highest bid among all bidders, but also it does not have a negative payoff. Besides, the hunter agent is using (11) to choose the winning bidder and (12) to verify the minimum requirement satisfaction of the second highest bid. Hence condition (iii) is also true. As a conclusion, according to Theorem 1 and also the decision-making algorithms of all agents participating in an auction, the result of the auction scenario is a NE.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to: 1) validate the fairness of the proposed algorithms, i.e. to ensure that the overall workload is distributed equally among agents of both type of agent, by comparing agents' effectiveness in a set of experiments and analyzing the results by paired T-test and ANOVA [36] methods, 2) study the effect of profit margins on the total effectiveness of the HGMP, 3) demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed multitask-planning algorithm for gatherers by investigating its effect on the HGMP's total effectiveness, and 4) to verify the functionality of the hunter and gatherer scheme, i.e. considering each task comprised of two sequential exploration and completion subtasks, by a comparison between the HGMP and a basic alternative method in which each agent does both hunting and gathering tasks itself.
To simulate the proposed approaches, we developed a multi-robot simulation platform in MATLAB from scratch. In this platform, we can implement the simulations on any custom map, while the number of each type of agent is adjustable. We provide some basic functions for each type of agent to enable them maneuver over the determined environment. For gatherers, we utilized A*-based motion planning algorithm which enable them to move along two points in a grid environment. In addition, we provided a basic frontier-based exploration algorithm [37] for hunters. Besides, the number of tasks is also adjustable while the get located randomly over the environment. As a matter of fact, we also provided the perpetual mode for implantation of the simulations where for each gathered task another task will be distributed randomly in the environment. Accordingly, at each iteration there are certain number of tasks available in the environment which is adjustable for each mission. Further, in the perpetual mode, each explored and known grid of the environment turns into an unknown grid after certain iterations. The perpetual mode helps the analysis be done in a much more accurate and evidence-based way.
All simulations have been executed under the following conditions: 1) the environment is sectioned as a A. Fairness of the HGMP To demonstrate that the accomplishment workload is distributed equally for each type of agent, the concept of fairness is introduced. To that end, we define an effectiveness factor for each agent of both types based on their costs and accomplishment. Then, using the statistical analysis, we prove the fairness of the HGM by comparing effectiveness of different agents of each type. 
Similarly, g j  and g j  denote the effectiveness of g j a and the total number of tasks gathered by the agent respectively, such that: n  , an ANOVA test has been applied to the collected data to statistically prove the fairness of the HGMP for hunters. The ANOVA test has been applied as follows: hhhh  === which means that there is no significant difference between averages of hunters' effectiveness in 200 tests.
In addition, as . According to the test, 0.315 p value −=.
Since p value  − we must retain the null hypothesis. Therefore, it has been proven that: 1 2 0 -0 gg D == as it is illustrated in Fig. 6 (b) , which means that there is no significant difference between averages of gatherers' effectiveness in 200 tests.
Both statistical analysis indicate that all agents of a same type behave analogously under similar characteristics. In fact, this analysis numerically validates the Nash equilibrium analysis proved for the HGMP. It means that if the fairness concept investigated above is not valid for the HGMP and favors certain agents unfairly, then there are strong motivations for other agents to deviate from the proposed negotiation structure.
B. Effect of Agents' Profit Margins on Mission's Effectiveness
The effects of scaling parameters of profit margins, 
We ran the algorithms for all values of  increases gradually to reach its maximum and then again decreases. 
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According to the proposed reasoning mechanism, when scaling parameter of an agent's CPM decreases, the agent gets less confident. And when the scaling parameter of an agent's UPM increases, the agent gets less conservative. In this regard, for both types of agents, the best strategy to reach the maximum of t  is neither being completely confident nor being fully conservative, but a combination of both leads to the optimum result.
The oblique yellow area in Fig. 7(b) , exposing the maximum values of t  , is much narrower than the one in Fig. 8(b) . It shows that the CPMs and UPMs of gatherers have more distinct influence on t  than the ones of hunters. The rationale behind this dissimilarity is that hunters rely on their CMPs and UPMs after hunting a task, i.e. they accomplish a task and then consider them only for finding a gatherer to complete the task. On the other hand, gatherers consider their CPMs and UMPs before gathering a task, i.e. before any accomplishment. Consequently, this difference causes a much more distinct influence of gatherers' CMPs and UPMs on t  .
C. The Effect of Multitask-planning on the HGMP's Effectiveness
In this section we aim to study the effect of the proposed multi-task planning algorithm for gathers on the total effectiveness of the HGMP defined in (17) . Accordingly, we investigate the effect of max q , which is the queue size of each gatherer, on t  . To that end, we ran 200 missions for each value of max q , varying from 1 to 10, and measured t  in each mission, as Fig. 9 illustrates the results.
To understand how much t  increase when max q changes from max 1 q = to max 10 q = , we applied a paired T-test to the two of collected data sets. The first data set contains 200 measures of and p value  − we reject 0 H . Therefore, the results prove that t  increases more than 70% by changing max q from 1 to 10. Moreover, the results also show that the HGMP remains fair for gatherer agents by increasing max q . Fig. 10 demonstrates that there is no significant difference between effectiveness of two gatherers for each value of max q . Besides, Fig. 11 shows that how the HGMP's total effectiveness converges for different values of max q in such a manner: max 1 q = , max 4 q = , and max 10 q = . According to the results, by increasing the value of max q , t  becomes more variant and the convergence time decreases, while t  enhances significantly as was proven before.
D. Functionality Validation of the HGMP by a Comparison
In this section we are intended to analyze the functionality of the proposed hunter and gatherer scheme. As discussed before, we consider a dynamic problem to be a TA:SP problem where each task is comprised of two sequential detection and completion subtasks. Although we have discussed different aspects of the proposed approach in the previous sections, here we want to explicitly compare the proposed approached with an alternative approach in which there is only one type of agent doing both exploration and completion of tasks together. According to the rationale behind the hunter and gatherer approach, hunters must be more agile and cost-efficient in exploration and maneuvering. Therefore, we first plotted the total effectiveness of the HGMP with respect to hg  which ranges from hg  , i.e. 0 hg = , to hg   , i.e. 1 hg = . Secondly, we ran the explained alternative approach to be able to judge the HGMP's functionality. Since in this approach there is no hunter and gatherer scheme, we only have one type of agent and the obtained total effectiveness is dependent from this ratio hg . By this comparison we basically wanted to answer this question that: is the HGMP profitable compared to the alternative method? Fig. 12 shows the results of the implemented simulations for that purpose, as explained above. Thus, the answer is it depends to the ratio hg  and that's why we ended up in having a criterion for the HGMP to be profitable. According to the results, for 0 In other word, if we employ two robots from different types as hunter and gatherer such that the hunter's cost for following a certain path is less that 0.6 of the gatherer's cost for following the same path, then employing the HGMP will be profitable.
Considering the USAR example, the hunter can be a small UAV, while the gatherer should necessarily be a heavy duty UGV. If we consider the cost as the power consumption, then easily this 0.6 h g    criterion will be satisfied.
A screen capture video of the simulation results can be found as a supplementary material along with this paper, by using the YouTube link "youtu.be/HJuiP5DMZfo", or by scanning the following QR code.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inspired by the problem of "MRTA in an unknown environment", we proposed the idea of task allocation based on coupling and cooperation between complementary teams in a hunter and gatherer scheme. Furthermore, this work presented distributed reasoning mechanisms relying on the notions of certainty and uncertainty profit margins in which levels of confidence and conservativeness are modeled, while an effective multitask-planning algorithm for gatherers is proposed that allows them to queue multiple tasks for finding the optimal solution for completing a group of tasks rather than doing one by one. By comparing the proposed hunter and gatherer scheme with an alternative method, where there is only one type of agent doing both exploration and completion of tasks together, we established a criterion to judge profitability of the proposed method. Examining the real world problems mentioned earlier confirms that the profitability criterion is reasonably satisfiable. We also found that extreme behavior of an agent, being too confident or too conservative, hurts the total effectiveness of the mission. Furthermore, statistical analysis demonstrates a significant improvement of total effectiveness effected by multitask-planning algorithm. However, while computational complexities for execution of the multitask-planning algorithm manifolds by increasing the size of an agent's queue size, the total effectiveness of the HGMP does not increase linearly. Future work will consider the problem of adjusting the scaling parameters by an agent during a mission to achieve the optimal performance from both agent and team point of view. We also intend to develop a multi-robot exploration algorithm based on the notions of profit margins in the context of dynamic MRTA problems and investigate the effect of different multi-robot exploration algorithms on the HGMP.
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